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1 Introduction
I present an algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy equilibria in n-player games with
strategic complementarities (GSC). I wish to emphasize five features of the algorithm:
1. It works only on GSC. But then GSC are common in many areas of economics—
Vives’s (1999) textbook attests to that. See also Topkis (1998), Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1992) for many economic examples of
GSC.
2. It finds the pure-strategy equilibria, but not the mixed-strategy equilibria. The
omission is justified because mixed-strategy equilibria are not good predictions in
GSC (Echenique and Edlin 2002).
3. It is fast. For example, it needs less than 5 seconds to find all equilibria in a
two-player game where each player has 20.000 strategies.
4. It is simple. I use the algorithm “by hand” on some bimatrix games to show that
the algorithm is very simple to apply.
5. For generic two-player GSC, I show that the algorithm is computationally efficient.
There are many algorithms for finding one equilibrium, called a “sample” equilibrium
(see the surveys by McKelvey and McLennan (1996) and von Stengel (2002)). But there
is essentially only a trivial way of finding all pure equilibria: enumerate all strategy
profiles and examine them one-by-one to see if they are equilibria. I shall call this
way the “trivial algorithm.” Not surprisingly, the trivial algorithm is very slow, and
computationally infeasible on large games. For example, the trivial algorithm needed 15
days to perform a simulation that my algorithm did in 5 minutes (see Section 7).
Some algorithms find a sample equilibrium that survives an equilibrium refinement—
typically perfection (a recent example is von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002);
∗I thank Matt Jackson, Ivana Komunjer, and Andy McLennan for comments and suggestions on an
early draft.
see McKelvey and McLennan (1996) and von Stengel (2002) for other examples). This is
some times adequate, but it is in general restrictive: there is normally no guarantee that
only one equilibrium survives the refinement, and the refinements do not always have
bite.
The algorithm I present is based on Topkis’s (1979) results that Robinson’s (1951)
method of “iterating best-responses” finds an equilibrium in GSC (see also Vives (1990)),
so the algorithm uses different—and simpler—ideas than the more recent literature on
finding equilibria.
I have developed applications of the algorithm that either illustrate how it works or
show that the algorithm is efficient. I have not stressed economic applications; the paper
is a paper on methodology. Nevertheless, there are many potential applications for the
algorithm. I shall mention two examples.
First, the US Department of Justice needs to predict the consequences of mergers
between firms; I claim that my algorithm can potentially be of help. They currently
postulate a model of a market, and compute a Nash equilibrium before and after the
merger of some firms in the market. But their conclusions may be different if they could
find all equilibria before and after the merger—for example, the merger could have no
effect on price if you look at some equilibria, but a large price increase if you compare
most equilibria. The models used are often Bertrand models with differentiated products
(see for example Werden, Froeb, and Tschantz (2001) or Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz, and
Werden (1997)). 1 It turns out that Bertrand models with differentiated products are,
under some conditions, GSC (Vives 1999, Milgrom and Shannon 1994). My algorithm
could then be used to compare all equilibria before and after the merger.
Second, finding all the equilibria of a game is particularly important for the design of
experiments. The designer needs to compare the observed outcomes with the equilibrium
predictions. Further, some of the most successful experimental studies involve GSC
(Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross 1990, van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990). The
algorithm I present can then be applied in the design of experiments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary definitions
and results. Section 3 shows informally how the algorithm works. Section 4 defines the
algorithm and presents the main results of the paper. Section 5 develops two simple
examples. Section 6 discusses an algorithm for a special class of GSC. Section 7 presents
computational results for simulations of GSC.
1The software they use is in http://mba.vanderbildt.edu/luke.froeb/software/
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2 Preliminary Definitions and Results
2.1 Basic Definitions and Notation
Let X ⊆ Rn, and x, y ∈ Rn. Denote the vector (max {xi, yi}) by x ∨ y, and the vector
(min {xi, yi}) by x ∧ y. Say that X is a lattice if, whenever x, y ∈ X, x ∧ y, x ∨ y ∈ X.
If X is a lattice, a function f : X → R is quasi-supermodular if for any x, y ∈ X,
f(x) ≥ f(x ∧ y) implies f(x ∨ y) ≥ f(y) and f(x) > f(x ∧ y) implies f(x ∨ y) > f(y).
Quasi-supermodularity is an ordinal notion of complementarities; it was introduced by
Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Let T ⊆ Rm. A function f : X × T → R satisfies the
single-crossing condition in (x, t) if whenever x < x′ and t < t′, f(x, t) ≤ f(x′, t) implies
that f(x, t′) ≤ f(x′, t′) and f(x, t) < f(x′, t) implies that f(x, t′) < f(x′, t′).
For two subsets A,B of X, say that A is smaller than B in the strong set order if
a ∈ A, b ∈ B implies a∧ b ∈ A, a∨ b ∈ B. Let φ : X  X be a correspondence. Say that
φ is increasing in the strong set order if, whenever x ≤ y, φ(x) is smaller in the strong
set order than φ(y). A detailed discussion of these concepts is in Topkis (1998).
An n-player normal-form game (a game, for short) is a collection Γ = {(Si, ui) : i = 1, . . . n},
where each player i is characterized by a set of possible strategies, Si, and a payoff func-
tion ui : S → R, where S = ×
n
j=1Sj. Say that players have strict preferences if, for all i
and s−i ∈ S−i, the function si 7→ ui(si, s−i) is one-to-one.
For each player i, let βi,Γ denote i’s best-response correspondence in Γ—the corresp-
ondence defined by
βi,Γ(s) = argmaxs˜i {ui(s˜i, s−i) : s−i ∈ S−i} .
And let βΓ(s) = ×
n
i=1βi,Γ(s) denote the game’s best-response correspondence. When Γ is
understood I shall write βi for βi,Γ and β for βΓ.
A point s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if s ∈ β(s). Let E(Γ) be the set of all Nash
equilibria of Γ. When Γ is understood, I shall write E for E(Γ).
2.2 The Model
Say that a game Γ = {(Si, ui) : i = 1, . . . n} is a finite game of strategic complementarities
(GSC) if, for each i, Si ⊆ R
di is a finite lattice, si 7→ ui(si, s−i) is quasi-supermodular
for all s−i, and (si, s−i) 7→ ui(si, s−i) satisfies the single-crossing property. The positive
integer di is the number of dimensions of player i’s strategies.
The results in this paper are for GSC that have simple strategy spaces. Concretely,
in the rest of the paper, I assume that
• Si = {1, 2, . . . Ki}
di
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• si 7→ ui(si, s−i) is quasi-supermodular for all s−i,
• (si, s−i) 7→ ui(si, s−i) satisfies the single-crossing property
Remark 1. One can think of the model as a discretized version of a game with continuous
strategy spaces, where each Si is an interval in some Euclidean space of dimension di.
For an example, see Section 7.
The assumption that Si = {1, 2, . . . Ki}
di simplifies the notation considerably, but I
should emphasize that the results hold for other classes of strategy spaces as well.
2.3 Auxiliary results
First, GSC have monotone best-response correspondences:
Lemma 2. (Milgrom and Shannon 1994) For all i, βi is increasing in the strong
set order, and inf βi(s), sup βi(s) ∈ βi(s).
See Milgrom and Shannon (1994) for a proof.
Second, I need some results and notation for games where we restrict the strategies
that players can choose: For each si ∈ Si, let S
r
i (si) = {s˜i ∈ Si : si ≤ s˜i} be the strategy
space obtained by letting i choose any strategy in Si, as long as it is larger than si. For
each strategy profile s = (s1, . . . sn) ∈ S, let S
r(s) = ×ni=1S
r
i (si). Denote by Γ
r(s) the
game where each player i is constrained to choosing a strategy larger than si. Then,
Γr(s1, . . . sn) =
{
(Sri (si), ui|Sri (si)) : i = 1, . . . n
}
.
The following lemmata are trivial.
Lemma 3. If Γ is a GSC, then so is Γr(s), for any strategy profile s ∈ S.
Lemma 4. If s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, and z ≤ s, then s is a Nash equilibrium of
Γr(z).
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 follow immediately from the definitions of GSC and of Nash
equilibrium.
Third, I shall exploit some previous results on finding equilibria in GSC. The method
of iterating β until an equilibrium is found is normally attributed to Robinson (1951).
Topkis (1979) proved that the method works in GSC. I call this method the “Robinson-
Topkis algorithm.”
Algorithm 5. The following are three variants of the Robinson-Topkis algorithm.
• T (s): Start with s0 = s. Given sk ∈ S, let sk+1 = inf βΓ(s
k). Stop when sk = sk+1.
• T (s): Start with s0 = s. Given sk ∈ S, let sk+1 = sup βΓ(s
k). Stop when sk = sk+1.
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• T r(s): Do algorithm T (s) in Γr(s).
Lemma 6. (Topkis 1979) T (inf S) stops at the smallest Nash equilibrium of Γ, and
T (sup S) stops at the largest Nash equilibrium of Γ.
See Topkis (1979) (or Topkis (1998)) for a proof of Lemma 6.
Remark 7. Note that T (inf S) is faster than “iterating inf βΓ(s
k)” suggests. When the
algorithm has to find inf βΓ(s
k), it knows that searching in the interval [sk, sup S] is
enough. The sequence {sk} is monotone increasing, so each iteration of T (inf S) is faster
the previous iteration. A similar thing happens to T (s) and T r(s).
3 How it works
“In the authors’ experience, an important idea in organizing the analysis of
a game by hand is to find one equilibrium, then ask how other equilibria
might differ from this one; there is currently no substantiation of this wisdom
in theory or computational experience.” (McKelvey and McLennan 1996, p.
28)
I shall use an example to explain how the algorithm works. The explanation shows
that the algorithm is a—rudimentary—substantiation of McKelvey and McLennan’s wis-
dom.
Consider a two-player GSC, Γ. Suppose that player 1 has strategy set S1 = {1, 2, . . . 15},
and player 2 has S2 = {1, 2, . . . 11} (the numbers do not matter, they just happen to give
a nice picture in Figure 1). The players’ joint strategy space, S1 × S2, is in Figure 1.
I do not specify the players’ payoffs because it is not necessary to understand how the
algorithm works, but suppose that we have calculated the players’ best-response func-
tions (to makes things simple, assume best-responses are everywhere unique), β1 and β2.
The game’s best-response function is β, where β(s1, s2) = (β1(s2), β2(s1)). Because Γ is
a GSC, β1, β2 and β are monotone increasing functions (Lemma 2).
First, it is necessary to understand how the Robinson-Topkis (RT from now on)
algorithm works. RT starts at the smallest strategy profile, (1, 1), and iterates the game’s
best-response function until two iterations are the same. Since (1, 1) is smaller than
β(1, 1), and β is monotone, we have that β(1, 1) is smaller than β(β(1, 1)) = β2(1, 1).
Similarly, β2(1, 1) is smaller than β3(1, 1), and so on: iterating β we get a monotone
increasing sequence in S. Now, S is finite, so there must be an iteration k such that
βk(1, 1) = βk−1(1, 1). But then of course βk(1, 1) = β(βk−1(1, 1)), so s = βk−1(1, 1) is a
Nash equilibrium.
It turns out that s is the smallest Nash equilibrium in Γ. Let s∗ be any other
equilibrium, and note that (1, 1) ≤ s∗. Monotonicity of β implies that β(1, 1) ≤ β(s∗) =
s∗. Then, iterating β we get
s = βk−1(1, 1) ≤ βk−1(s∗) = s∗.
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Equilibria States of the algorithm
Figure 1: The algorithm in a two-player game.
In a similar way, RT finds the game’s largest Nash equilibrium s by iterating the
game’s best-response function starting from the largest strategy profile, (15, 11).
I now describe informally the algorithm that I propose. Then I explain heuristically
why it works. Full details are in Section 4.
The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Find the smallest (s) and largest (s) Nash equilibrium using RT—note s and s in
Figure 1.
2. Consider Γr(s1, s2 +1), the game where player 1 is restricted to choosing a strategy
larger than s1, and player 2 is restricted to choosing a strategy larger than s2 + 1.
The strategy profile (s1, s2 + 1) is indicated in the figure with a circle © to the
right of (s1, s2), and the strategy space in Γ
r(s1, s2+1) is the interval [(s1, s2 + 1), s]
shown with non-dotted lines in the figure. Now use RT to find the smallest Nash
equilibrium in Γr(s1, s2 + 1), and let s
1 be this equilibrium. Each iteration of β is
shown with an arrow in the figure, and s1 is the black circle reached after three
iterations.
Similarly, consider Γr(s1 + 1, s2), the game where player 1 is restricted to choosing
a strategy larger than s1 +1, and player 2 is restricted to choosing a strategy larger
than s2. The strategy profile (s1 + 1, s2) is indicated in the figure with a circle ©
above (s1, s2), and the strategy space in Γ
r(s1 + 1, s2) is the interval [(s1 + 1, s2), s]
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shown with non-dotted lines in the figure. Use RT to find the smallest Nash equi-
librium in Γr(s1 + 1, s2), and let s
2 be this equilibrium.
3. Check if s1 and s2 are Nash equilibria of Γ. First consider s1. Because s1 is an
equilibrium of Γr(s1, s2 + 1), and β is monotone increasing, we only need to check
that s2 is not a profitable deviation for player 2. Similarly, to check if s
2 is an
equilibrium we only need to check that s1 is not a profitable deviation for player 1.
Let us assume that s1 passes the check while s2 fails, this is indicated in the figure
by drawing s2 as a gray circle.
4. Do steps 2 and 3 for Γr(s11, s
1
2 + 1), Γ
r(s11 + 1, s
1
2), Γ
r(s21, s
2
2 + 1), and Γ
r(s21 + 1, s
2
2).
5. Continue repeating steps 2 and 3 for each Nash equilibrium sk found, unless sk is
equal to s. The picture shows what the algorithm does for a selection of sks; note
that the algorithm starts at larger and larger ©-circles, and that it approaches s.
I should emphasize that I phrased item 3—the “check”-phase—in terms of the first
iteration of the algorithm. In general, let sk be a candidate equilibrium obtained as the
smallest equilibrium in some Γr(sˆ). To check if sk is an equilibrium I need to take a
confirmed (in Γ) equilibrium s∗ with s∗ ≤ sˆ and check that player i does not want to
deviate to some strategy in the interval [s∗i , sˆi].
Why is this check sufficient? First, s∗
−i ≤ s
k
−i, and β is monotone increasing, so
s∗i = βi(s
∗
−i) ≤ βi(s
k
−i) and hence the best possible deviation—βi(s
k
−i)—is larger than s
∗
i .
Second, sk is an equilibrium in Γr(sˆ), so no deviations larger than sˆi are profitable. Thus
we only need to check for deviations in the interval [s∗i , sˆi].
I now explain why the algorithm finds all the Nash equilibria of Γ. Suppose that s
is an equilibrium, so s ≤ s ≤ s. If s = s or s = s, then the algorithm finds s in step
1. Suppose that s < s < s, then either (s1, s2 + 1) ≤ s or (s1 + 1, s2) ≤ s (or both).
Suppose that (s1, s2 + 1) ≤ s, so s is a strategy in Γ
r(s1, s2 + 1). Note that s is also an
equilibrium of Γr(s1, s2 + 1): if a player i does not want to deviate from s when allowed
to choose any strategy in Si, she will not want to deviate when only allowed to choose the
subset of strategies in Γr(s1, s2 + 1). But s
1 is the smallest equilibrium in Γr(s1, s2 + 1),
so s1 ≤ s. If s1 = s the algorithm has found s. If s1 < s then either (s11, s
1
2 + 1) ≤ s or
(s11 + 1, s
1
2) ≤ s (or both). Suppose that (s
1
1, s
1
2 + 1) ≤ s, then repeating the steps above
we will arrive at a new sk ≤ s. The sequence of strictly increasing sks only stops when
sk reaches s, so s < s implies that there must be a sk = s. Since s is an equilibrium,
sk = s passes the test in item 3; hence the algorithm finds s.
4 The Algorithm
I need a notational convention: edil is the l-th unit vector in R
di , i.e. edil = (0, . . . 1, 0 . . . 0) ∈
Rdi , where the 1 is in the l-th position.
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Algorithm 8. Find s = inf E using T (inf S), and s = sup E using T (sup S). Let Eˆ =
{s, s}. The set of possible states of the algorithm is the power set 2S, the algorithm starts
at state {s}.
Let the state of the algorithm be M ∈ 2S. While M 6= {s}, repeat the following
sub-routine to obtain a new state M′.
Subroutine Let M′ = ∅. For each s ∈ M, i ∈ {1, . . . n} and l with 1 ≤ l ≤ di, if
(si + e
di
l , s−i) ≤ s, then do steps 1-4:
1. Let s∗ be a maximal element in
{
s˜ ∈ Eˆ : s˜ ≤ (si + e
di
l , s−i)
}
.
2. Run T r(si + e
di
l , s−i); let sˆ be the strategy profile at which it stops.
3. Check that no player j wants do deviate from sˆj to a strategy in the set
{
z ∈ Sj : s
∗
j ≤ z and (si + e
di
l , s−i)j  z
}
.
If no player wants to deviate, add sˆ to Eˆ.
4. Add sˆ to M′ (Let M′ = M′ ∪ {sˆ}).
Theorem 9. The set Eˆ produced by Algorithm 8 coincides with the set E of Nash equilibria
of Γ.
Proof. First I shall prove that the algorithm stops after a finite number of iterations, and
that it stops when M = {s}, not before (step “well-behaved”). Then I shall prove that
Eˆ ⊆ E , and then that E ⊆ Eˆ .
Step “well-behaved.” Let M ⊆ 2S be the collection of states visited by Algo-
rithm 8. Let C be the set of maps z : M → S such that
1. For all M∈ M , z(M) ∈M;
2. If the algorithm transits from M to M′, and there is at least one player i and
dimension l such that (z(M)i + e
di
l , z(M)−i) ≤ s, then z(M
′) is obtained from
T r(z(M)i + e
di
l , z(M)−i) from one such player and dimension in step 2 of Algo-
rithm 8.
Note that, for all M, M = {z(M) : z ∈ C}.
First I shall prove that the algorithm stops when it reaches state {s}, and not before. I
need to prove that s ≤ s for all s ∈ ∪{M : M∈ M}; which implies that z(M) ≤ s for all
z ∈ C. Let the stateM transit to stateM′. Let s′ ∈M′, then s′ must have been obtained
from some s ∈M, and some i and l with (si + e
di
l , s−i) ≤ s, by T
r(si + e
di
l , s−i) in step 2
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of the subroutine. By Lemma 6, s′ is the smallest Nash equilibrium in Γr(si + e
di
l , s−i).
By Lemma 4, s is a Nash equilibrium of Γr(si + e
di
l , s−i), so
s ≤ (si + e
di
l , s−i) ≤ s
′ ≤ s.
This proves that s ≤ s for all s ∈ M, for all M that transit to some state, and that
s′ ≤ s for all s′ ∈ M′ for all states M′ that are obtained by transit from some other
state. Unless s = s, these two possibilities cover all states in M , and if s = s there is
nothing to prove.
Now fix a state M. For all s ∈ M, s ≤ s, so if M 6= {s} then there is s ∈ M such
that s < s. So there are i and l such that (si + e
di
l , s−i) ≤ s. Thus the algorithm must
transit from M to a new state while M 6= {s}.
Second, let z ∈ C. Let M be any state in M , and be M′ be the state that it
transits to. I shall prove that, if z(M′) 6= s, then z(M) < z(M′). If z(M′) 6= s then,
by item 2 of the definition of C, there is some i and l such that z(M′) is obtained by
T r(z(M)i + e
di
l , z(M)−i) in Step 2 of the subroutine. So,
z(M) < (z(M)i + e
di
l , z(M)−i) ≤ z(M
′).
Hence z(M) < z(M′).
Now, M ⊆ 2S, and S is finite, so M and therefore C are finite sets. Each z ∈ C is
strictly increasing until z(M) = s, so the binary relation “M transits to M′” on M is
transitive. Thus, eventually z(M) = s for every z ∈ C. But then there is an M ∈ M
such that z(M) = s for all z ∈ C, as C is finite. Hence
M = ∪
{
z(M) : z ∈ C
}
= {s} ,
and Algorithm 1 stops at state M, after a finite number of steps.
Step Eˆ ⊆ E . I shall prove that Eˆ ⊆ E by induction. First, in the initial state, {s},
Eˆ ⊆ E by definition of Eˆ . Second, suppose that, when the algorithm is in state M, Eˆ ⊆ E ,
and that when the algorithm transits from state M to M′ sˆ is added to Eˆ . I shall prove
that sˆ ∈ E . By induction, this implies that Eˆ ⊆ E .
Suppose we obtained sˆ by running T r(si + e
di
l , s−i), for some s ∈M, and some player
i and dimension l. Fix a player j. I shall prove that sˆj ∈ βj,Γ(sˆ−j) by first finding a
strategy zj ∈ βj,Γ(sˆ−j), and then showing that uj(zj, sˆ−j) ≤ uj(sˆj, sˆ−j).
Let s∗ be the maximal element in
{
s˜ ∈ Eˆ : s˜ ≤ (si + e
di
l , s−i)
}
found in step 2 of the algorithm. Note that s ≤ (si + e
di
l , s−i), so the set of s˜ ∈ Eˆ such
that s˜ ≤ (si + e
di
l , s−i) is non-empty; thus s
∗ is well-defined. We have s∗j ∈ βj,Γ(s
∗
−j),
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as s∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Let s˜j ∈ βj,Γ(sˆ−j). Note that s
∗
−j ≤ sˆ−j, so Milgrom and
Shannon’s (1994) Theorem 4 implies that zj = s˜j ∨ s
∗
j ∈ βj,Γ(sˆ−j).
By definition of zj, s
∗
j ≤ zj. First, if (si +e
di
l , s−i)j ≤ zj, then uj(zj, sˆ−j) ≤ uj(sˆj, sˆ−j),
as sˆj ∈ βj,Γr(si+edil ,s−i)
(sˆ−j) because sˆ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ
r(si + e
di
l , s−i). Second,
if (si + e
di
l , s−i)j  zj then uj(zj, sˆ−j) ≤ uj(sˆj, sˆ−j) by step 4 of the subroutine. Hence
uj(zj, sˆ−j) ≤ uj(sˆj, sˆ−j), so zj ∈ βj,Γ(sˆ−j) implies that sˆj ∈ βj,Γ(sˆ−j). Player j was
arbitrary, so sˆ ∈ βΓ(sˆ) and sˆ ∈ E .
Step E ⊆ Eˆ . Let s ∈ E . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that s /∈ Eˆ .
Claim: Let Algorithm 8 transit from state M to state M′. If there is z ∈ M with
z < s then there is z′ ∈M′ with z′ < s.
Proof of the claim: Since z < s, there is i and l such that zil < sil. Then s is a
strategy profile in Γr(zi + e
di
l , z−i). If sˆ is the strategy profile found by T
r(zi + e
di
l , z−i),
then Lemma 6 implies that sˆ ≤ s, as s is a Nash equilibrium of Γr(zi + e
di
l , z−i). If sˆ = s
then s would pass the test of step 4 and be added to Eˆ , but we assumed s /∈ Eˆ so it must
be that sˆ < s. Set z′ = sˆ, then z′ ∈M′ by step 5, and the proof of the claim is complete.
Now, s /∈ Eˆ implies that s 6= s. Initially M = {s} so there is z(= s) in M with
z < s. Using the Claim above inductively, it must be that all stages of Algorithm 8
contain a z with z < s. But the final state of the algorithm is M = {s}; a contradiction,
since s ≤ s.
Remark 10. A modification of Algorithm 8 will make it run faster: Only do step 3 of the
subroutine if there is no s′ ∈ Eˆ such that sˆ ≤ s′, and sˆ ∈ S(si + e
di
l , s−i), for the s, i and
l at which s′ was found. For, if there is such an s′, then we know that sˆ /∈ E , as sˆ ∈ E
would imply that sˆ is an equilibrium of Γr(si + e
di
l , s−i), which contradicts that s
′ is the
smallest equilibrium of Γr(si + e
di
l , s−i).
Theorem 9 says that Algorithm 8 works. In the rest of the paper I show that it is
efficient.
5 Examples
I present two examples. The examples serve two purposes: First, they show how the
algorithm works. Second, they show why it is likely to be fast. In fact, the second
example suggests what features of a game would make the algorithm be inefficient, which
motivates the sufficient conditions for the algorithm to be efficient in Section 6 and the
simulations in Section 7.
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5.1 Example 1
Consider the two-player game on the left in Figure 2. Both players have identical strategy
sets, {1, 2, 3, 4}. The strategies are ordered in the natural way: a strategy si is larger
than strategy s′i if it is a larger number, so 2 is larger than 1, 4 is larger than 2, and so
on. With this order it is straightforward—if tedious—to check that Example 1 is a game
with strategic complementarities.
1 2 3 4
4 0, 3 2, 3 3, 4 5, 5
3 1, 3 3, 3 3, 4 4, 4
2 2, 3 4, 3 4, 4 4, 4
1 4, 4 3, 2 3, 1 3, 0
Example 1
1 2 3 4
4 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
3 1, 3 1, 2 1, 1 0, 0
2 2, 3 2, 2 2, 1 0, 0
1 3, 3 3, 2 3, 1 0, 0
Example 2
Figure 2: Two examples.
Algorithm 8 starts by finding s = inf E and s = sup E by RT: let us first iterate the
game’s best response function starting at the smallest point in the strategy space, (1, 1).
Now, β(1, 1) = (1, 1) so (1, 1) = inf β(1, 1), and the RT algorithm returns s = (1, 1) as
the game’s smallest equilibrium. Similarly, it returns s = (4, 4) as the game’s largest
equilibrium. Then, the initial state of the algorithm is M = {(1, 1)}, and the initial list
of equilibria is Eˆ = {(1, 1), (4, 4)}. See Table 1.
M Eˆ
1 {(1, 1)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
2 {(2, 3)} {(1, 1), (2, 3), (4, 4)}
3 {(3, 3), (4, 4)} {(1, 1), (2, 3), (4, 4)}
4 {(4, 4)} {(1, 1), (2, 3), (4, 4)}
Table 1: Iterations in Example 1
The initial state is M = {(1, 1)}. First, (1, 1) + (1, 0) = (2, 1) ≤ s, so we do steps 1-4
in the subroutine starting at (2, 1). inf βΓr(2,1)(2, 1) = (2, 3), and inf βΓr(2,1)(2, 3) = (2, 3),
so RT in game Γr(2, 1) returns (2, 3) as the smallest equilibrium in Γr(2, 1). In step 3
we need to check that player 1 does not want to deviate to play strategy 1, but playing
strategy 1 would yield her a payoff of 3, while playing strategy 2 yields her a payoff of 4.
Since the deviation is not profitable, we add (2, 3) to Eˆ . Second, (1, 1)+(0, 1) = (1, 2) ≤ s,
so we do steps 1-4 starting at (1, 2): inf βΓr(1,2)(1, 2) = (2, 2), inf βΓr(1,2)(2, 2) = (2, 3),
and inf βΓr(1,2)(2, 3) = (2, 3). Graphically, the action of inf βΓr(1,2) is
(1, 2) → (2, 2) → (2, 3) → (2, 3).
Thus RT returns (2, 3) as the smallest equilibrium in Γr(1, 2). To sum up, the result
of steps 1-4 is that the algorithm transits to state {(2, 3)}, and the list of equilibria is
Eˆ = {(1, 1), (2, 3), (4, 4)}.
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Now the state of the algorithm is {(2, 3)}. First, (2, 3) + (1, 0) = (3, 3) ≤ s, so we
do steps 1-4 in the subroutine starting at (3, 3). Note that inf βΓr(3,3)(3, 3) = (3, 3), so
RT returns (3, 3) as the smallest equilibrium in Γr(3, 3). In step 3 we need to check that
player 1 does not want to deviate from strategy 3 to strategy 2. In fact, strategy 2 gives
a higher payoff (4) than strategy 3 (3), so (3, 3) is not an equilibrium, and we do not
add (3, 3) to Eˆ . Second, (2, 3) + (0, 1) = (2, 4) ≤ s, so we do steps 1-4 in the subroutine
starting at (2, 4). Note that inf βΓr(2,4)(2, 4) = (4, 4), so RT returns (4, 4) as the smallest
equilibrium in Γr(4, 4). We already know that (4, 4) is an equilibrium of Γ. The result of
steps 1-4 is that the algorithm transits to state {(3, 3), (4, 4)}, and the list of equilibria
is Eˆ = {(1, 1), (2, 3), (4, 4)}.
The state of the algorithm is now {(3, 3), (4, 4)}. Both (4, 4)+(1, 0) and (4, 4)+(0, 1)
fail to be smaller than s, so we do not run the subroutine starting from (4, 4). Now,
steps 1-4 in the subroutine starting from (3, 3) + (1, 0) = (4, 3) or (3, 3) + (0, 1) = (3, 4)
give (4, 4) as the smallest equilibrium of Γr(3, 4) and Γr(4, 3). So, the final state of the
algorithm is {(4, 4)}, and the final list of equilibria is {(1, 1), (2, 3), (4, 4)}.
5.2 Example 2
Now consider the game on the right in Figure 2. RT yields (1, 1) as the smallest equilib-
rium, and (4, 4) as the largest equilibrium in Example 2. The initial state of the algorithm
is thus {(1, 1)}. We start the subroutine at (2, 1) = (1, 1) + (1, 0) and get back (2, 1) as
the smallest equilibrium of Γr(2, 1). But player 1 prefers strategy 1 over strategy 2, so
(2, 1) does not survive step 3. We start the subroutine at (1, 2) = (1, 1) + (0, 1) and get
back (1, 2) as the smallest equilibrium of Γr(1, 2). But player 1 prefers strategy 1 over
strategy 2, so (1, 2) does not survive step 3.
If one completes all iterations (shown in Table 2) it is clear that the algorithm stops
at all strategy profiles, and discards all but the largest and the smallest equilibria of the
game.
M Eˆ
1 {(1, 1)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
2 {(2, 1), (1, 2)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
3 {(3, 1), (2, 2), (1, 3)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
4 {(4, 1), (3, 2), (2, 3), (1, 4)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
5 {(4, 2), (3, 3), (2, 4)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
6 {(4, 3), (3, 4)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
7 {(4, 4)} {(1, 1), (4, 4)}
Table 2: Iterations in Example 2
Example 2 represents a pathological situation; the algorithm is forced to check all
strategy profiles of the game. The root of the problem is that the players are indifferent
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between many different strategies. I show in Section 6 that, if we rule out indifference
altogether, the algorithm is guaranteed to be efficient. Thus, generically in two-player
games, the algorithm is efficient.
Example 2 suggests that, if players are indifferent at some points in the strategy
space, but not for a very large set of strategies, the algorithm is likely to be fast. In
Section 7 I simulate games that are guaranteed to have some indifference, and show that
the algorithm is indeed still very fast.
6 Two-player games with strict preferences
Let Γ be a two-player game where players have strict preferences and d1 = d2 = 1. I
present a simple version of Algorithm 8 that finds all the equilibria of Γ. I can bound
the complexity of this simple version of Algorithm 8, and show that the complexity low
relative to the trivial algorithm.
Algorithm 11. Find s = inf E using T (inf S), and s = sup E using T (sup S). Let
Eˆ = {s, s}. The set of possible states of the algorithm is S, the algorithm starts at state
s.
Let the state of the algorithm be m ∈ S. While m 6= s, repeat the following sub-routine
to obtain a new state m′.
Subroutine If m + (1, 1) ≤ s, then do steps 1-4:
1. Let s∗ be a maximal element in
{
s˜ ∈ Eˆ : s˜ ≤ m + (1, 1)
}
.
2. Run T r(m + (1, 1)); let sˆ be the strategy profile at which it stops.
3. Check that no player j wants do deviate from sˆj to a strategy in the interval[
s∗j , (m + (1, 1))j
]
. If no player wants to deviate, add sˆ to Eˆ.
4. Let m′ = sˆ.
Say that Algorithm 11 makes an iteration each time it does steps 1-4. Say that
Algorithm 11 makes a payoff-function evaluation each time it calculates u1 or u2.
Theorem 12. The set Eˆ produced by Algorithm 11 coincides with the Nash equilibria of
Γ. Further, Algorithm 11 does at most min {K1, K2} iterations, and 2 (max {K1, K2})
2
payoff-function evaluations, before it stops.
Proof. First I prove that Algorithm 11 is well-behaved and stops when it says that it
stops. Let M ⊆ S be the set of states visited by Algorithm 11. Note that, for all m ∈ M ,
m+(1, 1) ≤ m′, for all m′ obtained at a later iteration of the subroutine. Further, at each
13
iteration of the subroutine there is a unique m found. So, if m,m′ ∈ M then either m′ is
found after m and m + (1, 1) ≤ m′, or m is found after m′ and m′ + (1, 1) ≤ m. Then,
M is totally ordered, and for any m,m′ ∈ M , if m 6= m′ then either m + (1, 1) ≤ m′ or
m′ + (1, 1) ≤ m. I shall prove below that m 6= s implies that m + (1, 1) ≤ s; so if m 6= s
then the algorithm does not stop at m. Since M is finite, the algorithm stops in a finite
number of steps, and it stops when the state is s.
I need to prove the following
Claim. If s ∈ E(Γr(s˜)), then either s = inf E(Γr(s˜)), or
inf E(Γr(s˜)) + (1, 1) ≤ s.
Proof of the claim. Suppose that s ∈ E(Γr(s˜)), and that s 6= sˆ = inf E(Γr(s˜)). By
Lemma 4, sˆ ≤ s. Suppose—without loss of generality—that s1 6= sˆ1. Now, sˆ1 ∈ βΓr(s˜)(sˆ2)
so s2 = sˆ2 would imply that βΓr(s˜)(sˆ2) has at least two different elements, s1 and sˆ1.
Impossible since players in Γ have strict preferences. It must be then that s2 6= sˆ2. But
then sˆ ≤ s implies sˆ1 < s1 and sˆ2 < s2, so sˆ + (1, 1) ≤ s. This proves the claim.
I now prove that M 3 m 6= s implies that m+(1, 1) ≤ s: let m′ ∈ M ∪{inf S − (1, 1)}
be the state from which m was obtained by T r(m′+(1, 1)). There must be such an m′ by
definition of m: either m is found in step 2 of the algorithm, or m = s, and thus m was
found by T (inf S) = T r(inf S). Now, m = inf E(Γr(m′+(1, 1))) and s ∈ E(Γr(m′+(1, 1))),
so the claim and m 6= s implies that m + (1, 1) ≤ s.
Second, I prove that Eˆ = E . The proof that Eˆ ⊆ E is very similar to the proof that
Eˆ ⊆ E in Theorem 9, so I omit it. I shall prove that E ⊆ Eˆ . Let s ∈ E and suppose, by
way of contradiction, that s /∈ Eˆ . Let m be some state of the algorithm such that m ≤ s,
we must have m 6= s or s would be added to Eˆ , since s ∈ E implies that s passes the test
in step 3. The claim implies that m′ + (1, 1) ≤ s, as m′ 6= s for the same reason that
m 6= s.
Now induct on M : M 3 s ≤ s, and if, at some state m, m ≤ s, then m′ + (1, 1) ≤ s
for the state m′ that the state transits to. By induction, we must have s + (1, 1) ≤ s. A
contradiction, as s ∈ E implies that s ≤ s.
Now I shall prove that the algorithm needs less than min {K1, K2} iterations. First,
each iteration of Algorithm 11 produces one and only one element of M , so there are no
more iterations than there are elements in M . Second, M ⊆ {1, . . . K1} × {1, . . . K2},
and for each m,m′ ∈ M , m 6= m′ then either m + (1, 1) ≤ m′ or m′ + (1, 1) ≤ m. Thus
M cannot have more elements than either {1, . . . K1} or {1, . . . K2}. Thus, M has not
more than min {K1, K2} elements.
Now I shall prove that Algorithm 11 needs no more than 2 (max {K1, K2})
2 payoff-
function evaluations. If K1 6= K2, let us change the game: add strictly dominated
strategies to the player with the smallest Ki until that player has as many strategies as
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the other player. Let K = K1 = K2. The worst-case calculation calls for maximizing
the number of iterations of Algorithm 11, even if it means fewer iterations of RT; this is
because each iteration of Algorithm 11 requires one call to the RT algorithm.
Let s = (1, 1) and s = (K,K). Suppose that, at each state m ∈ M , the call to
T r(m+(1, 1)) in step 2 of the algorithm returns m+(1, 1) as the smallest equilibrium in
Γr(m + (1, 1)). This gives M = {(i, i) : i = 1, . . . K}. Note that the transition from (i, i)
to (i, i)+ (1, 1) requires one call to T r((i, i)+ (1, 1)) that returns (i, i)+ (1, 1); so the call
to T r((i, i) + (1, 1)) only involves one calculation of best-responses in Γr((i, i) + (1, 1)),
which requires 2(K − i) payoff-function evaluations, as each player in Γr((i, i) + (1, 1)).
has K − i strategies. The transition from (i, i) to (i, i) + (1, 1) then requires a test in
step 3 of the algorithm, this test needs at worst 2i function evaluations—in the case
that all previous states turned out not to be equilibria of Γ. Hence, each iteration of
Algorithm 11 involves at worst 2i + 2(K − i) = 2K payoff-function evaluations. We
assumed that M = {(i, i) : i = 1, . . . K}, so there are at most K iterations. Since K =
max {K1, K2}, this proves that the algorithm needs at most 2 (max {K1, K2})
2 payoff-
function evaluations.
Remark 13. The bounds in Theorem 12 say how Algorithm 11 performs compared to
the trivial algorithm: Assume that K1 = K2 = K. The trivial algorithm requires
2K3 function evaluations—it needs to check if (s1, s2) is an equilibrium for K
2 different
values of (s1, s2), and each check requires two best-response calculations, i.e. 2K function
evaluations. Then, if we say that the “size” of the problem is n = 2K3, the complexity of
Algorithm 11, relative to the trivial algorithm, would be 2(n/2)2/3. So, the complexity of
Algorithm 11 is of order n2/3. But I should emphasize that these is a comparison with the
worst-case calculation for Algorithm 11 with the effort that the trivial algorithm must
make.
7 Performance
I evaluate the performance of Algorithm 8, using a class of two-player games where each
player has the interval [0, 1] as her strategy space. The algorithm is fast; I use Algorithm 8
with different discretizations—grids—of [0, 1], and show that, even when the resulting
grid is quite small (the number of strategies of each player is quite large), the algorithm
is very fast. I use the computations to compare Algorithm 8 to the trivial algorithm.
7.1 Class of games
I use a class of games that tend to have a large number of equilibria—Algorithm 8 is
faster the smaller is the number of equilibria, and I want to evaluate Algorithm 8 using
games where it does not have an apriori advantage.
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Algorithm K Avg. Eq. Time Games Total Time
trivial 1.000 28.8 43.6 min. 500 15.1 days
8 1.000 28.8 0.6 sec. 500 5 min.
8 3.000 39.7 0.4 sec. 2.000 13.3 min.
8 20.000 64.0 4.7 sec. 2.000 2.6 hours
8 40.000 64.3 15.5 sec. 2.000 8.6 hours
Table 3: Simulations (first two results are from a slower computer).
I use two-player games, where each player i has strategy set Si = [0, 1], and payoff
function
ui(si, s−i) = −(αi/10)(si − s−i)
2 + 200βi sin(100si)
+ (1/100) [(1− αi)si(1 + s−i)− (1/2− βi)s
2
i /100] .
The parameters αi and βi are in [0, 1]. I arrived at the above functional form by trying
to come up with games that have a fairly large number of equilibria. The first summand
is a “pure-coordination term,” its role is to produce multiple equilibria. The role of the
second summand is to provoke multiple maxima, so that preferences are not strict (see
Section 6); the second summand also helps in getting multiple equilibria. The third and
fourth summand are variants of polynomial terms that I found—by trial and error—often
produce multiple equilibria. Note that, with these payoffs, the game is a GSC.
I discretized the players’ strategy spaces, so that each player i chooses a strategy in
Si = {k/K : 0 ≤ k ≤ K}. I chose parameters αi and βi at pseudo-random from [0, 1]
using a uniform distribution.
7.2 Results
I now discuss the results of a series of simulations. The results are in Table 3. I first
compare the performance of Algorithm 8 and the trivial algorithm. Then I discuss what
the simulations say about Algorithm 8 in general.
Consider the first two lines of the table: I used the algorithms on 500 simulated
games, using K = 1.000—so each player had 1.000 strategies to choose from. In each
individual game, the parameters αi and βi were generated at pseudo-random from a
uniform distribution on [0, 1]; I used Algorithm 8 and the trivial algorithm on the resulting
game. On average, Algorithm 8 needed 0.6 seconds to find all equilibria of Γ. On
average, the trivial algorithm needed 43.6 minutes to do the same work. Just to stress
the difference, note that Algorithm 8 needed only 5 minutes to find the equilibria of the
500 games while the trivial algorithm needed more than 15 days to do the same work!
Table 3 contains the results of other simulations as well. (The first two simulations
in the table are from a slower computer than the others—I used a computer that could
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Figure 3: Relation between time and number of equilibria
be dedicated to the simulation for 15 days. 2) Algorithm 8 is fast, even on very large
problems. On average, Algorithm 8 needs only 4.7 seconds to find all equilibria in a game
where each player has 20.000 strategies, and 15.5 seconds when each player has 40.000
strategies. Again, the results are particularly striking if one looks at the “Total Time”
column: Algorithm 8 allows one to simulate 2.000 large games in a few hours.
Note that the speed of Algorithm 8 really makes a difference in the analysis of these
games. The average number of equilibria stabilizes around 64, after several increases in
K. We can then infer that the original game with continuous strategy spaces has on
average about 64 equilibria. If we were limited to the trivial algorithm, we would be
unable to work with a fine enough approximation to infer the number of equilibria of the
limiting game.
The graph in Figure 3 has more information. The graph plots the individual simula-
tions for the K = 40.000 case. First, Algorithm 8 never needs more than 100 seconds to
find the equilibria; and it needs less than one minute for all but a few games. Second,
note that more equilibria require more time, and that the relation between the number of
equilibria and time is approximately linear—in fact, a linear regression has an R2 of 0.93.
2The computer used in the first two simulations is a Sun Ultra 5 with a 360 MHz CPU and 512 MB
Ram. I did the other simulations on a Linux Dell Precision PC with a 1.8 GHz Xeon CPU and 512 MB
Ram.
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7.3 Implementation
I wrote an implementation in C. The code (and the output from the simulations reported
above) can be downloaded from http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~fede. The difficulty in
implementing Algorithm 8 is that the state, M, of the algorithm is potentially taken
from a large set of possible states. Reserving space for the possible values that M
can take may slow down the algorithm considerably. I found a rudimentary solution in
my implementation of the algorithm; hopefully a better programmer can write a more
efficient implementation.
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